Self-Help Repossession of Consumer Goods: A Constitutional Look at Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code by unknown
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 7 
Number 3 Symposium on Commercial Law pp.439-463 
Symposium on Commercial Law 
Self-Help Repossession of Consumer Goods: A Constitutional 
Look at Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Self-Help Repossession of Consumer Goods: A Constitutional Look at Section 9-503 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 7 Val. U. L. Rev. 439 (1973). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol7/iss3/7 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION OF CONSUMER
GOODS: A CONSTITUTIONAL LOOK AT
SECTION 9-503 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
INTRODUCTION
In recent years consumer credit, or "buying on the installment
plan," has become a widely accepted method for financing the pur-
chase of consumer goods.' With the widespread acceptance of the
Uniform Commercial Code,2 most installment sellers now secure
their transactions with Article 9 security interests.' Typically, the
buyer is permitted to retain possession of the collateral provided
that he does not violate any of the stipulations in the security agree-
ment4 that would give rise to a default.sShould default occur, one
option available to the secured party' is the right to repossess the
collateral without recourse to judicial process.7 Section 9-503 of the
Code provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default
the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking pos-
session a secured party may proceed without judicial pro-
cess if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action!
Non-judicial repossession was recognized long before the draf-
ters of the Code incorporated the remedy into 9-503. Under the
English common law, a creditor was permitted to use self-help to
recover possession of a chattel that was wrongfully detained, pro-
1. By the end of November 1972, outstanding consumer installment credit exceeded
$124 billion. Financial and Business Section, 59 FED. REs. BuLL. A 56 (Jan. 1973).
2. All states except Louisiana have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code by statute.
All references to the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCC] are to the 1972
Official Text and Comments.
3. Section 1-201 defines a "security interest" as "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
4. Section 9-105(1)(1) defines a "security agreement" as "an agreement which creates
or provides for a security interest."
5. The Code does not define default or state when it occurs. Rather, the contracting
parties are free to specify in the security agreement their own conditions that would constitute
a default. Borochoff Properties, Inc. v. Howard Lumber Co., 115 Ga. App. 691, 696, 155
S.E.2d 651, 654 (1967).
6. Section 9-105(1)(m) defines a "secured party" as "a lender, seller or other person in
whose favor there is a security interest .... "
7. The secured party may also sue the buyer on the debt or initiate other pre-UCC
foreclosure proceedings against the debtor. See UCC § 9-501(1).
8. UCC § 9-503.
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vided this could be accomplished without breaching the peace.'
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA)
in 1919, most American jurisdictions afforded creditors a similar
right to peaceably repossess collateral upon occasion of the debtor's
default under a conditional sales contract. 0 Following codification
of self-help in the UCSA" the modern Code endorsed analogous
provisions in 9-503.11
Proponents of self-help repossession contend that its use is nec-
essary to effectuate a swift and efficient disposition of the collateral
once default occurs. The primary concern of the creditor at such
time is to realize the largest possible return from liquidation of the
security. This can best be accomplished by eliminating expensive
court costs and reducing the likelihood of collateral depreciation
that would result from protracted judicial proceedings. Similarly,
it is argued that by maximizing the proceeds from liquidation the
debtor's equity in the collateral is preserved and the necessity for
deficiency judgments is reduced.' 4
Despite arguments to the contrary, some courts have begun to
question the validity of repossession without judicial process. Con-
sumer advocates maintain that depriving a debtor of his possessory
9. As noted by Blackstone:
Recaption or reprisal is another species of remedy by the mere act of the party
injured. This happens when any one hath deprived another of his property in goods
or chattels personal, . . . in which case the owner of the goods . . . may lawfully
claim and retake them wherever he happens to find them, so it be not in a riotous
manner, or attended with a breach of the peace.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 4.
10. Two pre-UCSA cases decided in Indiana that demonstrate the general acceptance
of recaption are Swain v. Schild, 66 Ind. App. 156, 117 N.E. 933 (1917); Sherman v. Jackson,
14 Ind. 459 (1860). See also 146 A.L.R. 1331 (1943).
11. U.C.S.A. § 16 provided:
When the buyer shall be in default in the payment of any sum due under the
contract, or in the performance of any other condition which the contract requires
him to perform in order to obtain the property in the goods, or in the performance of
any promise, the breach of which is by the contract expressly made a ground for the
retaking of the goods, the seller may retake possession thereof. Unless the goods can
be retaken without breach of the peace, they shall be retaken by legal process; but
nothing herein shall be construed to authorize a violation of the criminal law.
12. 2 G. GILMORE, SEcuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.1 (1965).
13. Comment, Non-Judicial Repossession-Reprisal in Need of Reform, 11 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REv. 435 (1970).
14. Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings under the UCC, 47 MINN. L.
Rv. 205, 253 (1962).
15. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture
Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
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interest in the secured collateral without notice and the opportunity
for a prior hearing violates his due process rights guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment and Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.'6
The District Court for the Southern District of California recently
reviewed these considerations in Adams v. Egley" and concluded
that Section 9503 of the California Commercial Code"8 failed to
maintain constitutional due process standards. Since Adams, other
jurisdictions have attempted to review 9-503 repossession proce-
dures, and although such courts have failed to reach the merits, it
is apparent that future litigation on this issue is forthcoming.'9
This note will present a constitutional analysis of the summary
repossession remedy contained in 9-503, and will seek to determine
whether this procedure infringes upon a debtor's due process rights.
An examination will then be made concerning the effect that prior
notice and due process hearing requirements are likely to have, both
on the creditor's interest in efficient repossession and the debtor's
desire to obtain readily available consumer credit. Since state ac-
tion is required to bring the fourteenth amendment and Civil Rights
Act protections into effect, attention will also be focused on whether
a legislative enactment of 9-503 constitutes sufficient state activity
to allow judicial review of private self-help repossession.
DUE PROCESS AND NON-JUDICIAL REPOSSESSION
The Sniadach Case and Its Progeny
Before considering self-help repossession in the light of 9-503,
it would be beneficial to examine briefly some of the recent case law
dealing with summary adjudications. In Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp.20 the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin wage
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
17. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), appeal docketed sub nom. Adams v. Southern
Cal. First Nat'l Bank, No. 72-1484, 9th Cir., Mar. 15, 1972.
18. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9503 (West 1963). The California Commercial Code adopts 9-
503 verbatim.
19. In the following cases the due process issue was not reached for want of state action:
Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc.,
121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972); Kirksey v. Theilig, 41 U.S.L.W. 2325 (D. Colo. Nov.
30, 1972).
The court in McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971), preceded
the Adams decision and also dismissed the complaint for failure to meet the "under color of
state law" requirement.
20. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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garnishment statute2' that allowed a creditor to secure a court at-
tachment of a debtor's wages prior to a hearing on the underlying
claim. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas declared
that, absent some compelling state interest, summary procedures
would not satisfy the requirements of due process.22 Not only did the
Wisconsin statute fall short of satisfying the compelling state inter-
est test, but its broadly drawn provisions failed to restrict the use
of garnishment procedures to extraordinary situations.13 The signifi-
cance of this decision was that for the first time the Court estab-
lished a requirement for a due process hearing before property could
be seized by prejudgment attachment. 4
Initially the scope of the Sniadach decision was unclear, since
the opinion had placed heavy emphasis on the grievous loss suffered
by low income wage earners when deprived of income. 5 Further, no
affirmative criteria had been established to gauge the degree of
compelling state interest needed to override a person's right to a
hearing when his property interests were affected." Consequently,
several courts confined Sniadach to its facts and, absent a situation
of grave necessity, readily found significant state interests to justify
summary proceedings. 7
21." WIs. STAT. § 267.18(2)(a), c. 507, § 1 (1965), as amended Wis. STAT. § 267.18(2)
(Supp. 1972).
22. 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
23. Id.
24. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 114 (1969).
25. 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969).
26. Although definite standards were not specified, Mr. Justice Douglas cited four cases
that indicate by implication the required degree of compelling state interest. Two of the cases
involved summary seizure of banks on the verge of failure by government officials. Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947), and Coffin Brothers v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928). In Ewing
v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950), the Federal Food and Drug Administrator
was permitted to seize a quantity of misbranded vitamin products summarily. The last case
allowed a resident creditor's prejudgment attachment of a nonresident's property in order to
obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
It is apparent from the first three cases that overwhelming public interests were at stake.
Even though the rationale of the fourth case is not as compelling, it should be recalled that
prejudgment attachment of a nonresident's property is sometimes the only method by which
state citizens can achieve redress for injuries inflicted by nonresidents. For further commen-
tary on these cases, see Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 548, 488
P.2d 13, 25, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 721 (1971), cert. denied sub nom. Northern Cal. Collection
Serv., Inc. v. Randone, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Comment, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1503,
1506 (1972).
27. See, e.g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (garnish-
ment of property other than wages); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970) (extra-
judicial foreclosure by the mortgagee of real property).
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Most courts, however, viewed Sniadach less restrictively and
began to examine other areas where due process rights allegedly had
been jeopardized by summary adjudications. Thus, in the cases that
followed, many new property interests other than wages were
brought within the purview of fourteenth amendment protections.2 1
Of paramount importance in these decisions was the general propo-
sition that
due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and
'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at
least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against
the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property
29
Fuentes v. Shevin
Not long after the Sniadach decision, courts in several jurisdic-
tions began to scrutinize the effect of their replevin statutes on a
debtor's due process protections.3 0 The leading case of Fuentes v.
Shevin3' merits particular attention, since an action in replevin 32 to
repossess collateral under a conditional sales agreement is very
closely related to the self-help remedies permitted by 9-503.
In Fuentes the Supreme Court reviewed the decisions of two
28. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (pre-hearing suspension of a driver's
license); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Klim v.
Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeeper's lien on boarder's property to secure
unpaid rent); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (landlord's lien on
tenant's property); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied sub nom. Northern Cal. Collection Serv., Inc. v. Randone,
407 U.S. 924 (1972) (prejudgment attachment of property upon the filing of an action on an
expressed or implied contract for the payment of money); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel
Servs., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970) (garnishment of debtor's accounts receiva-
ble pending judgment on the debt).
29. 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). Accord, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 540 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
30. See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)
(creditor restrained from utilizing New York's replevin statutes to repossess consumer goods
from indigent debtors); Kosches v. Nichols, 68 Misc. 2d 795, 327 N.Y.S.2d 968 (New York
City Ct. 1971). But cf. Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970) (creditor
permitted to replevy bowling equipment from defaulting purchaser).
31. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
32. "Replevin" is defined as follows:
A personal action ex delicto brought to recover possession of goods unlawfully taken,
. . . the validity of which taking it is the mode of contesting, if the party from whom
the goods were taken wishes to have them back in specie . ...
BLACK's LAw DIc'rYONAY 1463-64 (4th ed. 1968).
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three-judge courts3 3 which had upheld the constitutionality of the
Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes.34 The statutory scheme
of the Florida law enabled a creditor to seek a writ of replevin
without any showing that his goods were being wrongfully detained
by the defaulting debtor. After the creditor filed a complaint initiat-
ing a formal suit for repossession and posted a security bond for
double the value of the collateral, a writ was issued directing an
officer to recover the goods and serve the debtor with the complaint.
Following this ex parte repossession procedure the collateral was
impounded for three days, during which time the debtor could post
his own double bond and reclaim possession. If, however, the debtor
refused or was unable to file the required security, the property was
transferred to the creditor, pending final disposition of the underly-
ing suit for repossession." The Pennsylvania replevin statute was
markedly similar to the Florida law, with one glaring excep-
tion-the creditor was never required to initiate a formal court ac-
tion to establish his right to possession.38
Writing for a 4-3 majority, 37 Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that
the two replevin statutes violated a debtor's constitutional rights. 8
In reaching this decision, the Court clarified the two previously
noted ambiguities from the Sniadach case.39 First, application of the
due process clause was not to be confined to interests in specialized
33. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 402 U.S. 994
(1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S.
906 (1971).
In the Fuentes case the plaintiff-debtor challenged the replevy of a gas stove and stereo-
phonic phonograph that she had purchased pursuant to conditional sales contracts. The
creditor-defendant, Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., had repossessed the collateral after the
debtor terminated her payments subsequent to a dispute over the servicing of the stove.
Following the Florida procedure, the creditor had only to fill out a standard form document
and have it stamped and signed by the small-claims court clerk before the writ was issued.
For a highly informative narrative of this case compiled by the attorneys who represented
Mrs. Fuentes, see Abbott & Peters, Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Test Litigation
in the Legal Services Program, 57 IOWA L. REv. 955 (1972).
Three of the plaintiffs in the Epps case protested the repossession of personal property
that had been purchased under conditional sales agreements. A fourth plaintiff was the ex-
wife of a local deputy sheriff who disagreed with her custody of their son. Being familiar with
Pennsylvania's routine replevin procedures, the irate ex-husband replevied his son's clothes,
furniture and toys.
34. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.01 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (1967).
35. 407 U.S. 67, 73-75 (1972).
36. Id. at 75-78.
37. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate.
38. 407 U.S. at 96.
39. See notes 25 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
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properties or "necessities." 40 Like the wages in Sniadach, consumer
goods were thus construed to fall within the fourteenth amend-
ment's definition of "property." Although a debtor under a condi-
tional sales agreement lacks full title to the collateral,4 ' it was recog-
nized that he had acquired cognizable interests in both the use and
possession of the goods. Generally these rights are not secured
through a gratuitous gesture by the creditor; rather, the debtor typi-
cally pays substantial finance charges for the privilege of immediate
enjoyment of the merchandise. Therefore, the Court concluded that,
should a dispute arise over continued possession of the collateral, a
sufficient property interest would be jeopardized and the due pro-
cess protections should be invoked."
The second ambiguity resolved in Fuentes was the degree of
"compelling state interest" needed to justify a summary adjudica-
tion. It was noted that only in truly unusual circumstances will the
outright seizure of property be tolerated without prior notice and the
opportunity for a hearing.43 In such cases there must be important
governmental or public interests involved, a need for prompt action
and strict statutory control over the extra-judicial procedures." The
Court then proceeded to find the broadly drawn Florida and Penn-
sylvania replevin laws deficient in all three respects. Since the inter-
est of the creditor was purely private and there was no showing of
urgency, the statutes could not be used to repossess a debtor's prop-
erty before he had been afforded the chance to be heard.45
Finally, Mr. Justice Stewart considered the situation in which
a debtor signs an adhesion contract which purportedly waives his
due process rights. All of the debtors in Fuentes had signed finely
printed conditional sales agreements giving the seller permission to
repossess the merchandise in the event of default. The Court con-
cluded that when parties to a sales contract are in positions of vastly
unequal bargaining power there must be a clear showing that any
waiver of constitutional rights by the debtor was made "voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly.""
40. 407 U.S. at 88-90.
41. The Court need not have concerned itself with determining which party had title
to the collateral, since under the Code this distinction is immaterial. See UCC § 9-202.
42. 407 U.S. at 86-87.
43. Id. at 90.
44. Id -t 91
45. Id. at 90-93.
46. Id. at 94-96. Presumably the Fuentes decision would allow the continued use of
contractual waivers when it could be shown that the consumer voluntarily and knowingly
19731
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Adams v. Egley
In Adams v. Egley" the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California reviewed the self-help provisions
contained in Section 9503 of the California Commercial Code and
held them unconstitutional." Plaintiff Adams had taken a bank
loan for $1,000, in exchange for which he executed a promissory note
and security interest in favor of the bank. The agreement stipulated
that should default occur the secured party retained the right to
repossess plaintiff's three motor vehicles which had been pledged as
collateral. After the note had been assigned to a second bank,
Adams reneged on his payments. Subsequently, defendant Egley,
acting as an agent for the assignee, repossessed two of the vehicles
which were later sold at a private sale.49
Although Adams was decided four months prior to Fuentes, the
reasoning of the two cases was remarkably parallel. Like Fuentes,
the California district court chose to interpret the Sniadach decision
broadly, echoing the constitutional premise that absent extraordi-
nary circumstances a debtor could not be deprived of his property
without procedural due process."
The Adams court took issue with prior cases that had upheld
contractual waivers of due process rights in security agreements."s
Specifically, the court did not feel that "a statute providing for
relinquished his due process rights. The Court distinguished the instant case from D. H.
Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), in which the constitutionality of a
cognovit note executed between two large corporations of similar bargaining power was up-
held. In that context it was felt that the party which had agreed to a confession of judgment
was fully aware of the significance of waiving its constitutional rights. Cf. Swarb v. Lennox,
405 U.S. 191 (1972). It is difficult, however, to determine whether a valid waiver has actually
taken place in any given situation. It could well be that an initial hearing would be necessary
simply to establish the legitimacy of the waiver. The net effect of such a requirement un-
doubtedly would be the discouragement of all waiver clauses in consumer's sales contracts.
See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 H Av. L. REv. 1, 94-95 (1972).
47. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
48. The court also found the dispositive provisions in Section 9504 of the California
Commercial Code to be unconstitutional.
49. 338 F. Supp. at 616.
50. Id. at 618. Although Adams and Fuentes were decided on due process grounds, some
commentators have seen overtones of equal protection considerations in these decisions.
Advocates of this concept maintain that, inasmuch as the inequities of consumer credit
transactions are often felt most acutely by the poor, there is ample basis for raising the equal
protection arguments of the fourteenth amendment. Comment, 13 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REv.
1503, 1505 (1972); Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 954 (1970).
51. Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Fuentes v. Faircloth,
317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
[Vol. 7
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repossession without notice or hearing [was] exempt from constitu-
tional scrutiny merely because its operation [was] confined to situ-
ations involving the presence of a contract."52 While in some situa-
tions contracting parties of relatively equal bargaining power may
forego due process safeguards, there is a strong presumption against
the waiver of any constitutional rights. Demonstrating the same
skepticism voiced by Mr. Justice Stewart in Fuentes, Judge Nielsen
questioned the efficacy of waivers found in the usual consumer's
security agreement. 53
Consistent with recent judicial decisions exemplifying pro-
consumer concerns, 54 the Adams court sympathized with the plight
of low income buyers who are often victimized by abusive sales
practices. Sensing the divergence of opinion over whether the
Sniadach doctrine applied only to "necessary" property interests,
the court observed that ordinarily the subjects of Article 9 security
interests are common household goods and automobiles, which are
essential to maintain a decent standard of living. The general provi-
sions of 9-503 which permit self-help repossession of any secured
collateral, regardless of its nature, were thus found to be overly
broad.5 This distinction of "necessaries" vis-a-vis nonessential con-
sumer products need not have been made, for under the expanded
notions of due process dictated by Fuentes all significant property
interests merit the protections of the fourteenth amendment.
Contrasting the repossession procedures struck down in
Fuentes" with the 9-503 provisions reviewed in Adams, it is clear
that the Code's self-help remedy is even more deficient in respecting
the debtor's rights than the replevin statutes. While judicial control
over the replevin procedures may have been only perfunctory, there
was at least some point between default and repossession where the
judiciary was interposed between the conflicting claims of the par-
ties. Nowhere does a similar judicial intervention exist in the 9-503
self-help provisions. Further, a creditor seeking to replevy goods sold
pursuant to a conditional sales agreement was required to post bond
equal to double the value of the collateral. While this did not neces-
sarily guarantee good faith on the creditor's part, his latitude to
52. 338 F. Supp. 614, 620 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
53. Id.
54t. See, tf.g., ~ 11hl0v. V'Tle- homas rumtr CoIO4Lflf~*V.., 3....!5 .C. i. 1--65)
55. 338 F. Supp. 614, 621 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
56. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
1973]
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repossess merchandise arbitrarily was restricted to a significantly
greater degree than under 9-503, where no bond is required. It might
be argued that the debtor's right to redemption outlined in the
Code57 more easily facilitates his recovery of the repossessed collat-
eral than under the replevin statutes where he, like the creditor,
must post a double bond. In reality, however, a defaulting debtor
who is unwilling or unable to maintain his payment schedule will
doubtless find it just as cumbersome to secure bond as to fulfill all
of his obligations under the security agreement necessary for re-
demption.
It can be concluded that although Adams pre-dated Fuentes,
its reasoning relative to the constitutionality of 9-503 was consistent
with the due process requisites specified in the context of replevin
procedures. For the first time, the powerful self-help remedies au-
thorized in 9-503 had been declared unconstitutional. The far reach-
ing ramifications of this decision will be analyzed in the following
sections.
COMPETING INTERESTS UNDER 9-503: SECURED PARTY VS. DEBTOR
Advocates of the self-help repossession procedures outlined in
the Code maintain that a defaulting debtor's interests are ade-
quately protected by an elaborate set of restraints imposed on the
secured party after repossession of the collateral. 8 Initially the con-
sumer may seek to have the entire security agreement voided if it
is manifestly unconscionable" or adhesive. 0 The self-help remedy
57. Section 9-506 allows a debtor to redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment of
all obligations contained in the security agreement and reimbursing the creditor for all expen-
ses incurred in repossessing the goods. If the security agreement contains a clause accelerating
payment of the debt upon occasion of default, the debtor can only fulfill his obligation by
repaying the entire outstanding debt. See UCC § 9-506, Comment.
58. See Brief for the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code as
Amicus Curiae, Adams v. Egley, appeal docketed sub noma. Adams v. Southern Cal. First
Nat'l Bank, No. 72-1484, 9th Cir., Mar. 15, 1972. [This brief was prepared by Professor Soia
Mentschikoff, and will hereinafter be cited as MENrSCHIKOFF.]
59. UCC § 2-302(1) provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscion-
able clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result.
See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Unico v.
Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code's Solution
for Unconscionable Contracts, 48 ORE. L. REv. 209 (1969).
60. Contracts of adhesion can generally be characterized as one-sided agreements where
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 [1973], Art. 7
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is itself limited by the fact that only peaceable repossessions are
permitted.' Once the creditor acquires custody of the security he is
under a duty of reasonable care to preserve the consumer's equitable
interest in the goods."2 Should the secured party elect to sell the
collateral at a public sale, reasonable notification of the time and
place must be given to the debtor. 3 Similarly, a debtor is entitled
to notice of the time after which a private sale might be held to
liquidate the collateral.64 At no time before disposal of the goods
may the secured party interfere with the debtor's right to redemp-
tion, provided that the debtor has not waived this right after de-
fault. When the buyer has completed payment on 60 percent of a
debt arising from a purchase money security interest in consumer
goods, the creditor is estopped from keeping the collateral in satis-
faction of the loan unless the debtor has signed a statement after
default renouncing this right.6 Any sale of the goods must be con-
ducted in a commercially reasonable manner to insure the greatest
possible realization from liquidation. Finally, if the creditor dem-
onstrates a lack of good faith" or fails to adhere to any of the afore-
the seller attempts to limit his performance or liability through the use of finely printed
exculpatory clauses. Commonly these contracts are standard form sales agreements which
force the consumer into a take-it-or-leave-it position with respect to purchasing and financing
the merchandise. Recently courts have come to realize that contracts which force the buyer
to adhere to unconscionable terms are unenforceable. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the
Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction, 5 AKRON L. REv. 1 (1972); Kessler, Contracts of Adhe-
sion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
61. UCC § 9-503. The Code does not elaborate on the characteristics of a "breach of
the peace." If the debtor resists the repossession physically there is a good chance that the
courts will find that the peace has been broken. Similarly, creditors are well-advised not to
break into unoccupied homes. See Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d
25, 254 N.E.2d 683 (1970); 2 G. GiMoRE, SEcumrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.1
(1965).
62. UCC § 9-207(1). The secured party also has a duty to act reasonably in the care of
any personal articles accidentally taken when the collateral was repossessed, and failure to
exercise such care may allow the debtor to sue for conversion. This problem usually arises
when automobiles are retaken and the creditor either loses or damages personal property that
was contained in the vehicle. See, e.g., Southern Indus. Savings Bank v. Greene, 224 So. 2d
416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Petrillo, 253 Md. 669,
253 A.2d 736 (1969). Without actual damage, however, the simple accidental taking of any
items with the security will not amount to a conversion. See Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 324 F. Supp. 108 (D.S.C. 1971).
63. UCC § 9-504(3).
64. Id.
65. Ucc §1 9-50G.
66. UCC § 9-505(1).
67. UCC § 9-507(2).
68. UCC § 1-203. UCC § 1-201(19) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned."
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mentioned provisions, the debtor is entitled to either injunctive
relief or money damages."
In addition to the Code remedies, the debtor may utilize tradi-
tional tort theories to recover remuneration for injuries sustained
from a wrongful repossession. Should the secured party retake the
collateral without any claim of right he may be sued for conversion."
If the self-help methods used to repossess the merchandise are pat-
ently offensive to the debtor, the creditor may be liable for damages
resulting from defamation, abuse of process or the intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress."t Texas has even recognized the distinct tort
of unreasonable collection.72 As a result, a debtor in Texas who
becomes the victim of an unreasonable collection effort that causes
him either physical or mental injuries may sue the secured party for
actual or compensatory damages.
The obvious common denominator of both the Code and tort
remedies is that repossession must first have occurred for any of
them to be effective. This observation is crucial because it goes to
the heart of the due process theories espoused in Fuentes and
Adams. The paramount theme of those decisions was that a debtor
is entitled to a hearing before he can be deprived of his property. In
Fuentes the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it would not
"[embrace] the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it
can be undone."" Thus, the mere existence of post-repossession
remedies neither justifies self-help repossession per se nor obviates
the requirement for a due process hearing prior to recovery of the
collateral by the secured party.
An additional observation is that before any of these remedies
are actionable, the dispossessed debtor is obliged to initiate a law-
suit and formally assert his rights in court. To assume that the
average middle class debtor, let alone the low income consumer, has
ready access to an attorney and the courts is naive.74 It would be far
69. UCC § 9-507(1). See also note 103 infra.
70. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 79-97 (4th ed. 1971).
71. Id. at 57.
72. Note, Effectively Regulating Extrajudicial Collection of Debts, 20 MAINE L. REV.
261, 271-73 (1968). This source indicates that the following three factors are relevant in
determining whether the creditor's collection methods were unreasonable: the actual conduct
of the secured party, the foreseeability of either physical or mental injury to the debtor, and
the legality of the underlying debt.
73. 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
74. Comment, Non-Judicial Repossession-Reprisal in Need of Reform, 11 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 435, 458 (1970).
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better to force the secured party, prior to reclaiming the collateral,
to take the initiative in asserting his rights at a non-judicial hearing.
By informally settling disputes before repossession, the likelihood
that a debtor would be required to utilize these remedies could be
reduced.
Necessity for a Due Process Hearing
Proponents of summary repossession adamantly maintain that
the benefits to be achieved from a due process hearing are illusory.75
On the other hand, denying a seller of consumer goods the right to
recover the collateral by self-help deprives him of his most impor-
tant remedy." To facilitate discussion of the competing arguments,
the problems encountered in the repossession of two general types
of collateral will be analyzed. First, consideration will be given to
the recovery of common household products; and second, the spe-
cialized problems of automobile repossession will be scrutinized."
Ordinary household goods such as appliances, furniture and
television sets constitute the garden variety type of consumer prod-
ucts purchased under a security agreement." Typically these items
Even if the low income buyer is successful in gaining access to the courts, his chances of
successful litigation are often minimal. Ghetto merchants are notorious for "going out of
business" when in fact they have simply changed the name of their enterprise. The poor are
generally ignorant of the significance attached to receipts and warranties, and as a result they
frequently lose these papers prior to trial. In addition, retention of expensive professional
counsel is apt to neutralize any realization of damages. See D. CAPLOVrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE
171-75 (Free Press ed. 1967); Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 764-
65 (1967).
75. Mr. Justice White's dissenting comments in Fuentes are typical:
The Court's rhetoric is seductive, but in end analysis, the result it reaches will
have little impact and represents no more than ideological tinkering with state law.
None of this seems worth the candle to me. The procedure that the Court strikes
down is not some barbaric hangover from bygone days. The respective rights of the
parties in secured transactions have undergone the most intensive analysis in recent
years. . . .Recent studies have suggested no changes in Art. 9 in this respect ...
I am content to rest on the judgment of those who have wrestled with these problems
so long and often and upon the judgment of the legislatures that have considered and
so recently adopted provisions that contemplate precisely what has happened in
these cases.
407 U.S. 67, 102-03 (1972) (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
76. Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 27, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (1971).
77. UCC § 9-109(1) states that goods are " 'consumer goods' if they are used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Thus, ordinary household
products would be classified as consumer goods by the Code. An automobile would also be a
consumer good if its intended use was for personal or family purposes.
78. As of November 1972, installment credit for ordinary household products exceeded
$38 blion, or approximately 3U.7 percent of the total unpaid consumer debt. Financial and
Business Section, 59 FED. RES. BULL. A 56 (Jan. 1973). Roughly two-thirds of all buyers
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are moderately priced at the time of purchase, and, once repos-
sessed, offer little prospect for profitable resale.7" Since the likeli-
hood of significant recoupment from liquidation of the collateral is
remote, most secured parties would much prefer the buyer to com-
plete the payments, even if this necessitates an alteration of the
installment schedule." This situation also explains why an unscru-
pulous creditor in some cases will see greater advantage in using the
repossession statutes for their in terorem effect, rather than as a
means to recover the goods.81 Furthermore, a defaulting debtor is
not as likely to abscond with the ordinary consumer product since,
unlike an automobile, such collateral is usually not readily movable.
This factor would tend to dilute the argument that self-help is re-
quired to effect speedy repossession."
Conversely, a consumer may have legitimate interests that
need protection after default occurs. Although inability to pay is
probably the major cause of default on a security agreement, 3 the
buyer may nevertheless have a valid reason for refusing to continue
his installments. Failure by the seller to complete performance,
breach of warranty and lack of merchantability have long been rec-
ognized as adequate grounds for the debtor to suspend payment.8
Yet under the present system of self-help repossession these defen-
purchasing major durables finance at least a portion of the cost with consumer credit. Note,
Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 761 (1967). Since the close of World
War II the percentage of installment contracts delinquent for 30 days or more has remained
at a relatively constant three percent of the total number of outstanding loans. P.
MCCRACKEN, J. MAO & C. FRICKE, CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT AND PUBLIC POLICv 119
(1965).
79. Mindful that the secondhand market for ordinary consumer products is generally
limited, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter cited as U3C] has drastically
limited the creditor's right to seek deficiency judgments. When the value of the collateral is
less than $1,000, the secured party is precluded from suing for the unpaid balance after he
has repossessed the merchandise. U3C § 5.103(2). Alternatively, the creditor may bring an
action against the buyer for the entire unpaid debt, in which case he may not repossess the
collateral. Id. § 5.103(6)(a). See also Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
68 COLUM. L. REv. 387, 440-41 (1968).
80. Gifford, The Debtor's Default under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
With Suggestions for Draftsmen, 19 ALA. L. REv. 41 (1967); Hogan, The Secured Party and
Default Proceedings under the UCC, 47 MINN. L. Rav. 205 (1962).
81. D. CAPLOviTz, THE POOR PAY MORE 21 (Free Press ed. 1967); Note, Instalment Sales:
Plight of the Low Income Buyer, 2 COLUM. J. LAw & Soc. PROB. 1, 9 (1966).
82. Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Transactions,
8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 535, 557 (1967).
83. Note, Instalment Sales: Plight of the Low Income Buyer, 2 COLIM. J. LAW & Soc.
Prob. 1, 5-6 (1966).
84. See generally UCC § 2-313 (express warranties); UCC § 2-314 (implied warranty
of merchantability).
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ses can only be asserted after the debtor has lost control of the
collateral. Since in many cases the rights of the parties are indeter-
minate after default, it would seem inequitable to demand that the
consumer first relinquish his possessory interest and then shoulder
the entire burden of initiating a lawsuit to recover his loss. In addi-
tion, repossession of household commodities almost always necessi-
tates an invasion of private homes. 5 Had the consumer stolen the
collateral, it could only be retrieved by an officer after a magistrate
had issued a warrant. It is certainly incongruous for the law to
respect a felon's search and seizure rights while at the same time
authorizing a private creditor to summarily seize goods that the
consumer acquired lawfully.8
On balance, it can be concluded that, in the case of ordinary
household products, the secured party's interest in self-help repos-
session does not outweigh the debtor's constitutional rights to prior
notice and a hearing. It should be recalled that both Adams and
Fuentes confined the.use of summary procedures to extraordinary
circumstances. From the foregoing presentation of the competing
debtor-creditor interests at the time of default, it is evident that a
9-503 repossession presents no such unusual circumstances. Cer-
tainly the seller's concern in recovering modest property losses can-
not condone jeopardizing a consumer's due process rights guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment.
The problems of automobile financing, however, are in many
respects unlike those encountered in the sale of household goods.87
85. This intrusion of the home gives rise to a substantial possibility that the debtor's
right of privacy will be infringed. Considering the recently developed first amendment right
of privacy, it might be questionable whether self-help could pass constitutional muster on
this score. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
86. Some courts have now come to realize that the fourth amendment prohibitions
against unlawful searches and seizures are applicable when a civil repossession is contem-
plated, as well as when a crime has been committed. See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furni-
ture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. N.Y. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242,
96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
Speaking in relation to New York's replevin statutes, the court in Laprease stated:
The argument that the Fourth Amendment does not apply, is supported by
neither good sense nor law. If the Sheriff cannot invade the privacy of a home without
a warrant when the state interest is to prevent a crime, he should not be able to do
so to retrieve a stove or refrigerator about which the right to possession is dis-
puted .... "It is surely anomolous to say that the individual and his property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal behavior."
315 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (citations omitted).
87. As of November 1972, the total consumer debt arising out of automobile sales
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In most localities there is a relatively high demand for used cars,
which condition makes resale economically feasible. This factor
usually enables a secured party to recover most of his losses if he
can keep his depreciation costs down by minimizing the time be-
tween default and resale."8 Creditors therefore argue that the re-
quirement of a due process hearing merely creates costly delays and
increases the size of a deficiency judgment rendered against the
debtor. 8 A secured party also has a bona fide concern in rapidly
recovering an automobile, since it is a highly mobile form of collat-
eral and thus can easily be removed from the creditor's reach. Noti-
fying a defaulting debtor that his car is about to be repossessed will
doubtless increase the possibility of a "skip."° Finally, it has been
argued that, in the vast majority of defaults, the debtor has no real
assertable defenses against the secured party.8
Arguably the reasons advanced in favor of self-help are more
persuasive in the field of motor vehicle sales that those seen pre-
viously in the case of ordinary household products. Again the ques-
tion that must be answered is whether the circumstances surround-
ing automobile repossessions are truly extraordinary in view of the
Fuentes and Adams decisions. The Adams court specifically dealt
with a default on a motor vehicle security agreement and concluded
that no such compelling circumstances existed.2 Future courts and
legislatures may be inclined to weigh the practical considerations of
these repossessions more heavily and thus seek to authorize the
exceeded $43 billion, or approximately 35.1 percent of the total value of outstanding install-
ment loans. Financial and Business Section, 59 FED. RES. BULL. A 56 (Jan. 1973). In 1971, 50
percent of all persons purchasing new or used automobiles financed at least a portion of the
sales transaction with consumer credit. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 547 (Table 894) (93d ed. 1972). The 30-day
delinquency rate for direct bank loans was .77 percent as of February 1972. During the same
time period the corresponding delinquency rate for indirect loans (where the automobile
dealer assigns chattel paper to a bank or finance company) was 1.13 percent. MENTSCHIKOFF
17.
88. MENTSCHIKOFF at 21-22.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 27. Some commentators have questioned whether placing a consumer on
notice will increase his propensity to abscond with the automobile. Customarily a defaulting
debtor receives several delinquency notices and telephone calls from the creditor prior to
repossession. It is argued that if the debtor is intent upon stealing the collateral, he will have
had ample opportunity to do so before receiving notice of a repossession hearing. Note,
Replevin: A Due Process Prescription for an Ancient Writ, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 259, 265 (1972).
91. Even if the consumer has no valid defenses to assert, the Supreme Court has ob-
served that "[tihe right to be heard does not depend upon an advance showing that one will
surely prevail at the hearing." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972).
92. 338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
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continued use of self-help for automobile repossessions. Such a
move on the part of lawmakers would be regrettable, for it would
make a debtor's constitutional rights contingent on the dollar value
of the creditor's property interest in the collateral. Conceding that
the peculiar problems of motor vehicle repossession and resale war-
rant special treatment, a superior solution would be to establish a
highly efficient administrative body capable of dealing with auto-
mobile hearings on a priority basis. This procedure would serve to
mitigate losses suffered from collateral depreciation resulting from
time-consuming due process hearings.
Cost of a Due Process Hearing and Future Availability of Credit
Perhaps the major objection to abrogation of the self-help rem-
edy is the increase in costs that must necessarily be incurred to
finance due process hearings. One authority has estimated that re-
quiring judicial repossession of automobiles would cost $16 million
annually in the State of California. 3 Who will be called upon to bear
this cost is the pertinent question which the courts must ultimately
face. Unfortunately, all existing cases that have established a need
for a hearing have remained oblivious to this issue.94
The Code would allow these increased repossession costs to be
added to the debt owed by the buyer to the secured party.95 How-
ever, if it is necessary for the individual consumer to assume the
entire expense, it is doubtful that he would want an opportunity to
be heard unless he had an almost certain chance to prevail. Another
solution would be to spread the costs among the public at large. But
surely state legislatures will not be overly receptive to the idea of
raising tax rates in order to cure a predominately lower class prob-
lem. Perhaps the optimum solution would require the public to
assume the bulk of the expense, while at the same time charging a
nominal fee to the losing party at the hearing in order to insure good
faith litigation.
Another probable consequence of denying self-help to the se-
cured party will be the rise of interest rates on installment loans.
93. MFNTSCHIKori App. A, 35-36. This estimate was computed by Robert W. Johnson,
Professor of Industrial Administration, Purdue University. The total figure represents the
aggregate losses that would have been sustained had an estimated 66,000 automobiles been
judicially repossessed in California during 1971.
94. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S.
254, 266 (i970).
95. UCC § 9-504(1)(a).
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An inordinate increase of credit costs would be particularly unfor-
tunate for the vast majority of buyers who complete payment on
their security agreements without default." Furthermore, credit
could be thrown out of reach to some low income consumers who
formerly had access to it. Although some commentators believe that
higher interest rates would serve a beneficial purpose in curtailing
over-extension to high-risk debtors,97 there may be a need for some
governmental control to keep credit costs from spiraling."
No doubt the ultimate effect that prior notice and hearings are
likely to have on the consumer credit industry will not be as dour
as the critics predict. In Fuentes the Supreme Court simply estab-
lished that the debtor must have the opportunity to be heard; it did
not prescribe mandatory due process hearings in the instance of
every default. Only a small fraction of security agreements end in
default," and, of these situations, fewer present meritorious ques-
tions of fact that must be decided. Certainly it is logical to assume
that, when a consumer voluntarily discontinues his installment pay-
ments with full knowledge of the ensuing consequences, he will not
want to subject himself to the additional time and trouble of an
evidentiary hearing. Finally, the pessimistic projections of the cost
skeptics lose flavor when one queries: If the function of the judicial
system is not to settle disputes, what other purpose does it serve? 00
CHARACTERISTICS OF A DUE PROCESS HEARING
Both Fuentes and Adams established the need for a hearing
96. Commenting on this possibility in Adams, Judge Nielsen stated:
For those who make an earnest effort to maintain their payment schedules and
default due to circumstances beyond their control, creditors have traditionally exer-
cised considerable flexibility and have exhausted every reasonable alternative before
resorting to the drastic and expensive remedy of repossession. These persons, the
ostensible beneficiaries of Sniadach and its progeny, stand to suffer substantially in
the long run, if sellers and creditors raise their prices and interest rates commensur-
ate with the cost of the judicial process which these decisions make necessary.
338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
97. Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 549, 488 P.2d 13, 26, 96
Cal. Rptr. 709, 722 (1971), cert. denied sub nom. Northern Cal. Collection Serv., Inc. v.
Randone, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Note, Effectively Regulating Extrajudicial Collection of Debts,
20 MAINE L. REv. 261, 262 (1968).
98. For a listing of existing credit rate ceilings in the various states, see Hearings on S.
26 Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-13 (1967).
99. See notes 78 & 87 supra.
100. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971); Note, Replevin: A Due Process
Prescription for an Ancient Writ, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 259, 265 (1972).
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)rior to the time a creditor could summarily seize control of the
.ollateral after the debtor allegedly defaults. 0' However, neither of
;hese decisions chose to articulate any of the characteristics that a
lue process hearing should assume in order to protect the debtor's
-ights.12 At this juncture it would be profitable to enumerate some
f the essential elements that would be required to make the pro-
-eeding a meaningful opportunity in which the consumer could as-
sert his rights when faced with a 9-503 repossession.
Initially, it is important to realize that the only purpose of a
prior hearing is to ascertain the creditor's right to repossession.
Should the secured party, after he has retaken possession, damage
the buyer's equity in the collateral, the debtor would be entitled to
sue for damages either in tort or under 9-507(1) of the Code. 03 Con-
sequently, an informal administrative proceeding would be prefera-
ble to a more formal and protracted judicial trial.
Ideally each state should appoint an administrator whose func-
tion would be to supervise the establishment and maintenance of an
extra-judicial administrative agency designed to provide reposses-
sion hearings.1'0 When a debtor allegedly defaults on his security
agreement, the creditor would contact the agency, which in turn
would notify the consumer of the claim against him. If the debtor
elects to forego the hearing, either the agency or a law enforcement
officer could then proceed to recover the merchandise and deliver it
to the secured party. Should the buyer choose to contest the im-
pending repossession, a hearing would be scheduled so that he could
present his defense.
As a guide in formulating the procedural requisites necessary
101. 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972); 338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
102. The Fuentes court concluded that "[tihe nature and form of such prior hearings
• . . are legitimately open to many potential variations and are a subject . . . for legisla-
tion-not adjudication." 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972).
103. When a secured party fails to comply with Part V of Article 9, the debtor is
permitted to recover damages to the extent of his injury. In the special case of consumer
goods, 9-507(1) gives the debtor the right "to recover in any event an amount not less than
one credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt or the time
price differential plus 10 percent of the cash price."
104. In the six states that have enacted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code there is a
provision that establishes an extra-judicial administrative agency. The primary function of
the administrator under U3C § 6.104 is to insure compliance to the U3C from the consumer
credit industry. The authority of this administrator could be expanded to include the man-
agement of procedural machinery necessary to effectuate repossession hearings.
As of 1972, the following states had adopted the U3C: Colorado, Idaho, indiana, Okia-
homa, Utah and Wyoming. 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 12 (West Supp. 1972).
9731
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for an effective hearing, it would be appropriate to review some of
the guidelines outlined by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v.
Kelley.1'° There the Court elaborated the procedures required in a
hearing to terminate welfare benefits; although the problems en-
countered in commercial law are not always as acute as those found
in poverty law, certain inferences can definitely be drawn. Minimal
due process considerations espoused in Goldberg dictate that the
administrative proceeding be held "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."''0 Timely and adequate notice accompanied
with a brief statement of the secured party's grounds for relief
should be sent to the debtor in advance of the hearing.' 7 A buyer
who has allegedly defaulted should also have the opportunity to
present his own evidence orally and to cross-examine any adverse
witnesses.'08 Lastly, it is axiomatic that the decisionmaker render an
impartial decision based solely on the evidence presented at the
hearing. 10
Even though the Goldberg decision did not require an attorney
to be appointed for the welfare recipient, it did concede that he
should be allowed to retain one if he so desired.'"' Unlike the welfare
recipient who probably will have to confront his caseworker at a
termination proceeding, a defaulting debtor will in many instances
have to oppose a highly trained corporate attorney. This disparity
in legal proficiency between the conflicting parties could make a
mockery out of a hearing theoretically designed to protect a con-
sumer's due process rights. Keeping in mind the added expense of
professional representation, the administrative officer should be
vested with limited discretion to appoint counsel for indigent debt-
ors in those cases where the possibility of grave injustice exists.
An additional factor that has yet to be resolved is the burden
of proof that must be assumed by a secured party at a repossession
105. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
106. Id. at 267, quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
107. Id. at 267-68.
108. Id. at 268.
109. Id. at 271. Whether or not the decision reached at the hearing should be subject
to full judicial review is a question yet to be resolved. The Goldberg court did not endorse
review of the decisionmaker's determination in a welfare case, since there was already a
statutory procedure for a post-termination hearing. Should a state choose to expand the
function of the administrator under the U3C, as suggested in note 104 supra, there is a
provision for judicial review of contested cases in U3C § 6.414. However, in view of the
debtor's extensive UCC rights and remedies after default, it might be overly zealous to
demand review of repossession hearings. See notes 59-69 supra and accompanying text.
110. 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
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hearing. In Fuentes, the majority talked in terms of the creditor
establishing a "probable validity" that he had the right to replevy
the goods."' If, as Mr. Justice White maintained in dissent, a credi-
tor need only make out a prima facie showing of default, the her-
alded virtues of a due process hearing would not be realized."' One
commentator has suggested that a more realistic burden would be
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard commonly encoun-
tered in civil actions. Using this approach the creditor would have
to prove that it was more likely than not that he was entitled to
replevin." 3 Similarly, the secured party in a 9-503 repossession
should be required to assume the "preponderance of the evidence"
burden. The replevin suit presented in Fuentes was a possessory
action preceding a full-dress hearing to determine whether a credi-
tor could retain title to the collateral. Since the Code considers the
collateral's title immaterial,"' there is no provision for a subsequent
judicial proceeding after repossession has occurred pursuant to 9-
503. Hence the circumstances surrounding an Article 9 repossession
warrant the imposition of the more stringent "preponderance of the
evidence" burden.
The Supreme Court has observed that "It]he formality and
procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the
importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subse-
quent proceedings.""' In that light, the preceeding recommenda-
tions are intended only as a skeletal model of procedures that could
be adopted to accommodate an evidentiary hearing prior to a 9-503
repossession. In the future, state legislatures should be encouraged
to experiment with alternative methods designed to safeguard a
defaulting debtor's rights consistent with the due process prescrip-
tions of the fourteenth amendment.
STATE ACTION AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF 9-503
To date, five courts have attempted to determine whether a
repossession under 9-503 constitutes a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. With the exception of the Adams case, no
111. 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972), quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
112. 407 US. 67, 1l9 (1P79.) (White J., dissenting).
113. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 90 (1972).
114. UCC § 9-202.
115. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
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court has been able to find the state action required to bring the
fourteenth amendment protections into effect."' It is therefore rele-
vant to consider briefly whether the enactment of 9-503 as a state
statute satisfies the state action requirement,"7 even though the
section merely authorizes a private creditor to repossess collateral
summarily pursuant to a private security agreement.
Resolution of the issue seems to hinge in part on the construc-
tion given to the Supreme Court's decision in Reitman v. Mulkey. 118
In 1964 the people of California voted to amend their state constitu-
tion with a provision that made it unlawful for the state to interfere
with the sale of private homes."" Under a guise of state neutrality,
the effect of the amendment was to encourage private racial dis-
crimination which would have been constitutionally prohibited had
the legislature expressly authorized it.' 20 Speaking for the majority,
Mr. Justice White affirmed the lower court's conclusion that "a
prohibited state involvement could be found 'even where the state
can be charged with only encouraging' rather than commanding
discrimination.' 2'
Applying a parallel analysis, the court in Adams reasoned that
the existence of 9-503 as a state statute encouraged creditors to
incorporate self-help repossession into their security agreements.
116. See note 19 supra.
117. Some courts have distinguished the state action requirement of the fourteenth
amendment from action "under color of state law" necessary to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Since these distinctions are not relevant to the instant analysis, attention will be confined to
a discussion of the fourteenth amendment jurisdictional requirements. See Klim v. Jones, 315
F. Supp. 109, 113-17 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
118. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
119. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (1964) read in part as follows:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell,
lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such
property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion chooses.
120. The amendment, presented on the ballot as Proposition 14, also had the effect of
repealing pro tanto two existing California statutes which had made it illegal for private
realtors to discriminate racially. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West
Supp. 1972); Rumford Fair Housing Act, CAL. HsALTHI & SAF. CODE §§ 35700-44 (West 1967).
It might be argued that the nullification of these laws was in itself the basis of state action
in Reitman. However, the California Supreme Court correctly noted that the legislature was
under no initial obligation to enact these statutes, and thus their mere repeal would not
necessarily have constituted state action. But beyond countermanding the Unruh and Rum-
ford Acts, the state had placed its imprimatur on private discriminations by "constitution-
alizing" the right to sell real estate without state interference. 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967).
121. 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967), quoting Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 536, 413 P.2d
825, 832, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 888 (1966), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 967 (1966).
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Thus, even though the contracting parties were private individuals,
there was sufficient influence exerted on the agreement by the stat-
ute to satisfy the state action requirement.' 2
Just two weeks after Adams was decided by the Southern Dis-
trict Court of California, the Northern District Court of the same
state was presented with an almost identical fact situation in Oiler
v. Bank of America.'23 Despite the similarities, the constitutional
due process issue failed for want of state action. The judge in Oller
believed that Reitman could be distinguished, since the problems
seen in the context of racial discrimination were of greater magni-
tude than those found in commercial transactions. 2 In essence, the
court stated that although there was some state action, such action
was not sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Unless the
scope of the fourteenth amendment is to be confined to situations
involving racial discrimination, the Otler decision may be criticized
on the ground that the presence of state action should not depend
on the type of injury being suffered, but rather on the degree of state
involvement with the cause of the harm. Certainly the degree of
state entanglement in the field of commercial law cannot be deemed
de minimis. When the legislatures adopted Article 9 of the Code, of
which 9-503 is a part, they demonstrated a clear intent to control
the entire domain of secured transactions.'2 5 Even though 9-503 en-
dorsed the use of private self-help, the fact remains that the right
was a state-created policy embodied in a state statute.
A more persuasive argument to defeat state action was devel-
oped in Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 2 1 in which the constitu-
tionality of 9-503 was again questioned. In that case the court recog-
nized that self-help is an ancient remedy which was in existence
long before the Uniform Commercial Code adopted it in Article 9.
Since the creditor's original right to summary repossession was not
dependent on a statute, it was concluded that the presence of a
statute which authorized a concurrent right did not amount to state
action.'27 An opposite result could have been reached had the
122. 338 F. Supp. 614, 617 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
123. 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
124. Id. at 23.
125. For a development of the "state entanglement" theory, see Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
126. 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972).
127. Id. at 5, 295 A.2d at 405-06.
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Messenger court followed the holding in Klim v. Jones, 28 in which
the constitutionality of an innkeeper statute was under considera-
tion. The common law right of an innkeeper to seize a tenant's
property as security for unpaid rent was recognized, like self-help,
long before the statute was drafted. Finding appropriate jurisdiction
to reach the merits, the court held that "when private action con-
forms with state policy, it becomes a manifestation of that policy
and is thereby drawn within the ambit of state action."'' 9
Perhaps the state action question can best be answered by re-
turning to the Civil Rights Cases, 30 where the "under color of state
law" doctrine was originally formulated. There the Supreme Court
declared:
[U]ntil some State law has been passed. . . adverse to the
rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can
be called into activity: for the prohibitions of the amend-
ment are against State laws . . . .
One authority has suggested that the above quotation implies that
any state statute is ipso facto state action. 32 If the courts could
accept the mere existence of 9-503 as state action without looking
to the section's substance, many of the jurisdictional problems asso-
ciated with judicial review of self-help would be eliminated.
CONCLUSION
Recently refined concepts of procedural due process are apt to
have a far reaching impact on the powerful creditor remedy of self-
help found in 9-503. It is doubtful whether a secured party's right
to repossess collateral summarily will be able to withstand the con-
stitutional directive that entitles a debtor to notice and a hearing
before he can be deprived of any significant property interest. But
the attendant problems with providing prior notice and due process
hearings are likely to be severe. Higher interest rates and reduced
128. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
129. Id. at 115, quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 203 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
131. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
132. Black, "State Action, "Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 69, 84 (1967).
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availability of credit could well be the unpleasant consequences of
otherwise well-intentioned judicial opinions designed to benefit the
consumer. With creative legislation it may be possible to devise
efficient administrative procedures capable of handling the required
evidentiary hearings at a minimum cost. It is hoped that future
courts will overcome the jurisdictional complexities surrounding
state action and meet the challenge of solving the vital issues that
concern creditor and consumer alike.
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